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Abstract 
 
This article questions the idea that the EU is a pure regulatory power based on 
supranational delegation of competence from the Member States. It claims the insufficiency 
of this single paradigm to explain the developments of EU law and the need to integrate it 
with recognition of the constitutional foundations of EU law. 
The analysis demonstrates this by focusing on a specific case study of institutional design 
in the internal market integration: the delegation of powers to EU agencies. By recognising 
the judicial evolution of the so-called Meroni doctrine concerning the non-delegation of 
powers to EU agencies, the article unveils that, legally speaking, the enhancement of EU 
agencies’ powers takes place in the autonomous constitutional framework of the EU legal 
order. 
This constitutional foundation of EU law shall therefore complement the supranational 
delegation paradigm. Only in this wider approach can the legitimacy of EU agencies’ powers 
be framed and accommodated in the composite nature of the EU as a Union of Member 
States. On these grounds, the final remarks highlight the need for a more comprehensive 
paradigm for EU law that can explain these different aspects of EU law under a common 
approach based on a wider public law discourse. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When understanding the potential and the limits of EU action, the identity of the EU 
legal order and the nature of the EU integration process matter. The debate about EU 
integration is a consolidated one. Political science scholarship has been a major contributor 
to understanding the integration process. The debate has developed also within legal 
scholarship and it has mainly concerned the legitimacy of the EU legal order. The legal debate 
has polarised the discussion between the search for the constitutional foundations of an 
autonomous legal order and the analysis of the cooperation and integration in the multilevel 
governance. Broadly speaking and simplifying the different aspects of the legal debate, legal 
scholarship has explored the EU either as a constitutional subject or as a phenomenon of 
regulatory governance. 
When analysing the supranational law framework of the EU, however, these competing 
approaches do not appear mutually exclusive as the legal debate may have indirectly 
suggested so far. This article claims that these approaches are complementary and that, 
individually taken, none of them can capture the real nature of the EU law, but can only 
contribute to highlighting specific aspects of the EU experience. EU law offers many 
examples of this hybrid nature of the EU, caught between the constitutional and the 
regulatory dimensions. I will demonstrate this by focusing on a specific case study concerning 
of the EU institutional design: the delegation of powers to EU agencies. Despite their 
governance vocation, EU agencies are conceived and developed as fully supranational actors 
under EU secondary legislation. They operate in the regulatory sphere, but they require 
constitutional justification. Their powers are the expression of a specific constitutional 
experience that finds its roots in the composite nature of the EU legal order. 
As the evolution of the Court of Justice (CJEU)’s case law points out, legally speaking 
the evolution of administrative powers at the EU level cannot be explained through the pure 
lenses of the supranational delegation from the Member States. The administrative law 
relationship that EU agencies develop presupposes the development of an autonomous 
supranational order that constitutionally frames EU agencies’ powers. Only the existence of 
a constitutional principle at the EU level concerning the conditions for the delegation of 
powers conferred upon the EU institutions to EU agencies explains if and how EU agencies 
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may legitimately retain regulatory powers. This principle known as the Meroni doctrine 
shows the autonomous foundation of the responsibilities and tasks of EU agencies at the 
supranational level. 
The resulting legal framework goes beyond the paradigm of supranational delegation 
from Member States without disregarding it. A wider paradigm shall cover the 
complementarities of the different approaches and explain the integration process without 
losing important aspects of the EU identity. As Cassese (2015) has shown, the openness of 
public law can create new frameworks for law by combining different levels of regulation 
and meaningful interactions that generate institutional changes. The recognition of the 
complementarity of paradigms in the characterisation of the EU legal order may generate 
this wider public law approach to EU law that includes and reinterprets them in a composite 
framework.  
EU agencies’ powers and the guarantees of their exercise need to be designed by 
considering the original character of the EU legal order, as a Union of Member States. 
Accountability and legitimacy issues, therefore, shall be addressed not only at the 
supranational framework of EU powers, but also within the multilevel structure of the EU. 
This means that not only the Meroni doctrine, but also the supranational delegation paradigm 
may contribute to re-connecting the EU administrative developments to the legitimate 
functioning of the EU legal order.  
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, it introduces the paradigm of supranational 
delegation and points out its limits. Subsequently, the constitutional foundations of the 
Meroni doctrine in the EU legal framework are presented (sec. 3) and the analysis shows 
how EU law goes beyond the direct link to supranational delegation (sec. 3.1). A wider 
approach based on the composite nature of EU public law emerges (sec. 4). Political 
accountability and legal accountability are thus analysed with regard to both the EU and the 
Member States and their citizens (sec. 5). The final remarks emphasise the need for a more 
comprehensive public law paradigm to understand the powers of EU agencies and, more 
generally, the nature of EU law. 
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2. The slippery nature of  the EU integration process 
 
The EU integration process has been explained in different ways. Theories of EU 
integration have developed different approaches to the issues and the evolution of the EU. 
Since the 1970s, theories of governance have been developed to explain that specific aspect 
of the integration process; that is, the supranational integration in the internal market. 
When conceiving EU integration as a phenomenon of governance, emphasis is put on 
the regulatory role of EU institutions and bodies which operate at the EU level. The EU 
integration process is considered as being based on the delegation of regulatory powers from 
the Member States to the EU institutions as the result of a broader process of fragmentation 
and diffusion of normative powers. This reading of EU integration conceives the idea that 
EU institutions retain regulatory powers, which have been conferred by the Member States 
with the aim of satisfying functional demands, but upon the condition of retaining oversight 
over the exercise of the conferred powers. 
This approach was first developed by political science scholarship, which emphasised 
that the technocratic power of the EU was a means for Member States to insulate themselves 
from political pressures and commit to implementing EU policies (Majone 1990, 1994: 23; 
1995 and 1996). Subsequently, the legal scholarship has further explored the governance 
approach to integration and distinguished the EU as a form of deliberative supranationalism 
from a constitutional experience. In his scholarship on legal history, Lindseth (2010 and 
2014) has particularly described EU integration as an ‘administrative’ phenomenon, as it 
regards the conferral of specialised regulatory powers not on the basis of the expression of 
a general democratic will, but on the grounds of a delegation of powers from nation state 
institutions. 
The rejection of the constitutional foundations is based on a political approach to 
constitutionalism that emphasises the primacy of the politics embedded in the democratic 
process (Goldoni 2012: 928-937). The administrative approach to EU integration aims to 
reconcile the functional demands of economic interdependence for supranational regulatory 
solutions with the state-based concepts of democratic and constitutional legitimacy. It points 
out that the construction of the EU lacks political autonomy as it derives its legitimacy from 
the constitutional systems of its Member States. From this point of view, this approach is 
linked to the theories which have discussed the political legitimacy of the EU as based on 
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the national democratic circuits (Moravcsik 1998; Weiler 1982 and 1991; Nicolaïdis 2004 and 
2010). 
Lindseth considers the political-cultural nature of such an administrative integration and 
he presupposes and implies the absence of autonomy of the EU as a (constitutional) legal 
order. The EU benefits from a ‘mediated form of legitimacy’, which stems from its Member 
States and their citizens. Member States are thus understood as the principals overseeing the 
EU, the agent. European integration is not conceived as a phenomenon of constitutional 
law, because the EU legal order excludes a ‘true’ constitutional foundation, which remains in 
the domain of the single Member States and is entrenched in the national populations and 
in the national democratic institutions. According to this paradigm, EU is the expression of 
administrative governance beyond the state based on the voluntary decision of national states 
to delegate powers and pre-commit to the law that such delegation entails (Lindseth 2014: 
534 and 549). From a political-historical standpoint, the EU results in something different 
from a constitutional phenomenon as it rests upon the transfer of powers to supranational 
institutions from the Member States which democratically retain them. 
Building upon the same bottom-up approach to EU integration, however, different 
theories of constitutionalism can reverse these conclusions. Admitting that the legitimacy of 
the EU rests upon the democratic constitutions of the Member States, EU law may appear 
as an experiment of multilevel constitutionalism based on a plurality of national constitutions 
committed to a supranational constitutional experience (Pernice 1999; Walker 2009). It has 
also been considered as a process of constitutional synthesis, founded on the supranational 
reinterpretation of Member States’ constitutional and institutional structures (Menéndez and 
Fossum 2011; Milwald 1992; for a critical approach see Goldoni 2014). 
When claiming that the EU and particularly the European Monetary Union (EMU) is 
not based on ‘political constitutionalism’, but rather on ‘republican intergovernmentalism’, 
Bellamy and Weale (2015: 269-270) share Lindseth’s interpretation of EU governance. These 
scholars consider that the commitment to EMU rests upon political democracy at national 
levels which provide governments with the necessary (democratic) legitimacy to enter into 
credible commitments. They also observe that this is confirmed by the decisions of the 
German Constitutional Court: the legitimacy of the German state’s commitment to EU goals 
and policy is legitimate as long as it is consistent with the principles of the German Basic 
Law, the Grundgesetz.I The conclusion of these scholars, however, is that the EMU is an 
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experiment of legal constitutionalism -rather than one of administrative governance- because 
it provides a set of legal rules which ‘constrain the action of politically responsible decision-
makers’ and ‘disregard […] the existence of reasonable differences in political judgment over 
the principles that should govern a monetary union made up of different sovereign states, 
each with their own traditions of economic and monetary policy’ (Bellamy and Wale 2015: 
259-260). 
This variety of interpretations highlights the intrinsic difficulty of classifying the 
construction of the EU from a single legal point of view. If the theory of supranational 
delegation can describe EU integration in the internal market from a political and historical 
perspective, it cannot capture the development of the EU as an autonomous legal order in 
the discourse of its own institutions. Legally speaking, the comprehension of European 
integration cannot be clearly reduced and limited to a manifestation of a specific area of 
national law. Interferences between different law domains are at the heart of the slippery 
legal nature of the EU legal order. When looking at EU law as a supranational experiment 
of administrative governance beyond nation states, some autonomous developments of the 
EU institutional design and regulatory framework cannot be easily reconnected to this 
approach. Through the Principal-Agent theory ‘supranational autonomy is primarily a 
function of the control mechanisms established by member states to control their 
international agents’ (Pollack 1997: 119). As Pollack highlighted, however, this theoretical 
framework is not fully supported by institutional developments which jeopardise the model 
by presenting unexpected situations where supranational institutions can creatively exercise 
their autonomy (Pollack 1997: 106-107 and 128-130).II As the scholarship of historical 
institutionalism has observed, EU institutional design depends on the choices that Member 
States are willing to make, both at the supranational level and in intergovernmental settings, 
but then it produces autonomous effects - also unintended - which bind the Member States 
themselves and their future options (Pierson 1996: 147-148; Scharpf 1998: Verdun 2015: 
230-232). Scholarship of intergovernmentalism also noted that Member States negotiate and 
decide within an integration framework which is path-dependent from an institutional setting 
with endogenous interdependency and preferences (Schimmelfenning 2015: 192). 
Legally speaking, the theory of supranational delegation may build upon an 
administrative law assumption, but then it produces significant constitutional effects at the 
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EU level. This clearly emerges when analysing how EU law has embodied the delegation 
principle in the principle of conferral, as set in art. 5 TEU: 
 
‘1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
2. The Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States 
in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the Member States.’ 
 
The principle rests upon the transfer of competences from sovereign Member States to 
the EU, but within the domain of the devolved competences then the EU is only committed 
to the implementation of the Treaties and the exercise of its powers is only limited by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set in EU law. The oversight of Member 
States is therefore constrained by the rule of the Treaties which thus founded the 
constitutional legitimacy of the EU legal order and its institutions. If the oversight of 
Member States is mediated by the Treaties and their institutions, the linearity of the 
supranational delegation paradigm is not able by itself to explain the developments in the 
interpretation and the autonomous evolution of EU powers within the framework of the 
Treaties.  
As Weiler (1991: 2407) has observed, the EU appears to be as a ‘specified interstate 
governmental structure defined by a constitutional charter and constitutional principles’. 
Legally speaking, EU case law clearly affirms the constitutional nature of the EU as an 
autonomous community based on the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights.III 
It also shows that when applying the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, as well as 
when recognising the competences falling within the EU domain, the Court of Justice of the 
EU has adopted a standard of review which favours further developments of EU action and 
responsibilities (Craig 2012: chapters 14, 19-20; Weatherill 2011; Harbo 2010; Schütze 2009: 
250; Tridimas 2006: chapters 3-4; Kumm 2006; Estella 2002; de Búrca 1999). Without this 
peculiar constitutional nature of the Treaties, the further development of EU powers beyond 
the supranational delegation from the Member States cannot be legally explained. 
When understanding EU law, the idea of a supranational administrative governance shall 
be complemented by and adjusted to the existence of an autonomous dimension of the EU 
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legal order which cannot be explained by the delegation of administrative powers from the 
Member States, but needs to be understood within the particular categories of EU law. These 
are two faces of the same coin: if you look from the perspective of the Member States, you 
must admit that they have politically accepted to confer part of their powers upon 
supranational institutions and you can conceive the transferred powers as regulatory in 
nature; but if you look from the perspective of EU institutions then you see an autonomous 
supranational legal order which is committed only to the goals set in the Treaties and which 
binds Member States and shapes their individual legal orders according to the framework of 
the Treaties. When doing this, unforeseen legal instruments and new regulatory solutions can 
be autonomously developed under the framework of EU law. 
The legal potential embedded in the EU legal order shows that a gap exists between the 
political dimension of the EU integration and the legal one. The political sovereignty of the 
Member States does not correspond to their legal sovereignty. EU law creates effective 
constraints and allocates fundamental rights which affect both states and individuals. The 
challenge is how to reconcile the political and legal dimensions. Administrative governance 
as such is not able to effectively fill this gap. Only a broader understanding of how to 
reconnect the supranational delegation of competences from the Member States and the 
autonomous supranational developments of EU law can do that. 
 
3. EU agencies in the supranational foundations of  EU 
 
The autonomous development of the EU law has produced constitutional principles and 
institutional structures that affect the decision-making in the Member States and commit 
them to the enforcement of EU law. Under EU administrative law, supranational 
phenomena of administrative governance are justified in the light of the Treaties as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice. In the silence of the Treaties about the possibility to 
delegate powers to EU agencies, the Court of Justice has set the constitutional constraints 
that kept these bodies within the EU legal framework. These constraints represent the legal 
justification of EU agencies’ powers and make delegation a phenomenon of pluralisation and 
specialisation of EU powers. If supranational delegation may be considered a preliminary 
condition for the delegation of powers to EU agencies, it cannot explain neither whether nor 
to what extent delegation to EU agencies may be legally possible and necessary. A contrario, 
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this means that the legal substance of supranational delegation is shaped by the autonomous 
evolution of the EU legal framework. Because of this autonomous dimension of EU public 
law, the content of the principle of conferral has changed and new regulatory instruments 
have been developed under EU law. 
The growth of EU agencies’ powers in the internal market is the consequence of the 
need for specialisation and technical expertise in some domains where EU law should be 
developed and implemented (Hofmann and Morini 2012: 421-423; Groenleer 2009: 100-108; 
Magnette 2005: 7-10). However, this functional development of EU law has been legally 
constrained by the principle of conferral as set in the Treaties and interpreted by the Court 
of Justice. The principle of conferral shaping the (political) delegation of competences to EU 
institutions has the supranational effect of designing a system of division of powers at the 
EU level which cannot be arbitrarily changed by EU institutions. 
The non-delegation doctrine that generally goes under the label of the Meroni doctrine 
has defined the legal limits to the growth of EU agencies’ powers.IV The concern of this 
doctrine is the protection of the balance of powers as set in the Treaties: conferred 
responsibilities cannot shift from the EU institutions that legitimately retain competences to 
other bodies outside the relation of supranational delegation from the Member States. If this 
is the substantive issue, however, the evolution of EU case law on EU agencies’ powers 
demonstrates that the balance of EU powers depends on the autonomous legal 
developments of the EU legal order. The connection with the Member States through the 
principle of conferral does not prevent EU law from implementing autonomous instruments 
of governance in the internal market. The real issue of delegation at the EU level concerns 
the constitutional status of EU agencies, on the one hand, and the nature and the guarantees 
about how these agencies exercise powers, on the other hand. As soon as some changes had 
intervened in these regards, the limits to the conferral of tasks on EU agencies also changed 
in the interpretation of the Court of Justice. 
By analysing the evolution of the Meroni doctrine, I will demonstrate that legally 
speaking, the EU presents original characteristics as an autonomous legal order. The legal 
constraints to EU agencies’ powers are not at the disposal of the Member States and it rests 
upon the judicial review of the constitutional framework of the EU. Inasmuch as the 
legitimacy of EU agencies’ powers is located in the autonomy of the EU legal framework, 
only legal procedures and remedies can legally reconnect the exercise of EU agencies’ powers 
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to the supranational delegation theory. The following sections will show how the judicial 
interpretation of the Meroni doctrine evolved in almost sixty years of integration according 
to the Treaties and their interpretation. 
 
3.1. Addressing EU agencies’ powers through the lens of the Meroni doctrine 
The allocation of powers to EU agencies is a clear example of the legal autonomy of the 
EU from its Member States. Unlike the case of EU institutions, only recently have EU 
agencies been recognised as institutional actors under the Treaties. Before the Lisbon Treaty, 
agencies were not included in the Treaties, falling outside the principle of conferral (Lenaerts 
1993). Legally speaking, the evolution of their powers is connected to the exclusive 
development of the EU legal order. 
To preserve the allocation of competences as set in the Treaties and not to alter such 
legal framework, the CJEU developed in the Meroni doctrine the rules for reconciling the 
need to keep the structure of the supranational legal order unchanged, with the need to 
delegate technical tasks to expert supranational bodies. This case law is based on the principle 
of the balance of powers as the other-face of the principle of conferral. The competences of 
EU institutions cannot be altered by further delegation of tasks implying the exercise of 
political discretion to bodies not included in the Treaties. By making the institutions able to 
act only in accordance with the powers they have been conferred by the Treaties, this 
principle further specifies the more general principle of division of powers within the 
framework of the European legal order (Jacqué 2004: 383-384). Under the ECSC Treaty, 
Meroni questioned the delegation of power from the High Authority to two bodies under the 
Belgian private law – the so-called Brussels agencies – for dealing with financial arrangements 
of the ferrous scrap regime. In doing this, the Meroni case set the necessary principles and 
conditions under which any delegation of powers from institutions may be feasible (see 
Tridimas 2010: 241-243; Tridimas 2012:60-62). 
The case held that delegation should find its structural limit in the impossibility of 
delegating those powers whose exercise requires a discretionary evaluation, since this 
involves a shift of responsibility not expected by the Treaty. In the Meroni case, the concept 
of wide discretion referred to a quasi-legislative power ‘which may, according to the use 
which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy’.V In addition, 
the delegation of powers should be explicit and in line with the principle of conferred 
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competences: if necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks,VI the delegating authority can 
only provide an agency with powers explicitlyVII and within the limits of the powers it retains. 
Tridimas (2012: 60-62) has identified in the necessity requirement the further condition of 
proportionality for lawful delegation. These tasks should then be performed by the agencies 
under the same conditions as the delegating authority would have performed them. This 
means that the execution of the delegated tasks should be subject to the same procedural 
guarantees to be applied by the delegating authority as a necessary condition for its 
legitimacy. 
Subsequently, the non-delegation doctrine has been further developed in the Romano 
case. Under the EEC Treaty, Romano questioned the delegation of regulatory powers from 
the Council to a body established under EC secondary law, the Administrative Commission 
on Social security of Migrant Workers. In a preliminary ruling, the CJEU held that agencies 
cannot impose methods, interpretative rules or obligations to national administrations, but 
they can only help such national administrations by providing non-binding decisions,VIII so 
as to specify that agencies cannot exercise any rule-making power, but they can only have 
recommendatory powers. 
Only executive powers could thus be delegated from Treaty-based institutions to 
agencies and their use must be entirely subject to the supervision of the delegating institution. 
This has been interpreted as holding that no regulatory power can be delegated to agencies 
without prejudicing the design of powers as set in the Treaties. Administrative rule-making 
has therefore been frozen with the aim of keeping the institutional structure unchanged and 
compliant with the principle of conferral. In this line, the non-delegation doctrine has 
become a constitutional principle of the EU legal order concerning the possible allocation 
of public powers. 
Nonetheless, insofar as internal market development and its proper functioning require 
those administrative functions to be performed by supranational administrations, an 
increasing number of agencies have been performing functions that substantially touch upon 
a regulatory content. Even if formally these agencies have limited powers and issue opinions 
or draft technical standards to EU institutions or recommendations to Member States, they 
often retain powers that stretch the Meroni doctrine. The European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), for instance, issues standards which effectively commit Member States to the 
implementation of EU regulation in the aviation sector (Simoncini 2015a). More recently, 
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the European Supervisory Authorities in the financial markets (ESAs) have been bestowed 
with more intense powers of supervision and regulation which were reviewed by the Court 
of Justice according to the Meroni doctrine (Simoncini 2015b). 
The recent ESMA - short selling case has somehow opened the door to further EU 
administrative integration through the development of EU agencies’ regulatory powers.IX 
The case concerned the ESMA’s power to prohibit or impose conditions on the entry by 
natural or legal persons into transactions in the short selling market or require such persons 
to notify or publicise their positions, if and when there is a threat to the orderly functioning 
and the stability of financial markets with cross-border implications; and no competent 
authority has already taken measures to address such threat.X 
When reviewing the compatibility of European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA)’s 
powers with the Meroni doctrine, the CJEU updated the Meroni doctrine to the changed 
constitutional framework which emerged in the Lisbon Treaty. Firstly, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has recognised agencies as legal actors within 
the EU legal order.XI Italian administrative law scholarship has assessed this as the end of the 
precondition on which the Meroni doctrine was based; that is, the absence of any 
constitutional foundation for agencies’ powers (Sorace 2012: 53). Furthermore, the TFEU 
holds that legal remedies apply also to EU agencies’ acts when ‘intended to produce’ legal 
effects on third parties and this makes explicit the principle of judicial review already present 
to the EU judiciary.XII Against this changed constitutional backdrop, the CJEU confirmed 
the validity of the logic of non-delegation of discretionary powers, but it ‘mellowed’ Meroni 
(Pelkmans and Simoncini 2014), whereas it probably set aside Romano. 
The CJEU recognised that the EU legislative power may legitimately confer 
administrative powers to EU agencies under defined conditions. The CJEU upheld the rules 
about delegation of powers defined in the Meroni case, but noticed that the allocation of 
direct supervision powers potentially involving a regulatory impact was grounded on well-
restricted conditions which make the discretionary power of intervention subject to strict 
exercise and effective judicial review. Against the changed backdrop of the Treaties, the 
Court delineates a form of administrative discretion which is situated between the mere 
executive powers (exercised in completely bound administrative activities) and the ‘wide 
margin of discretion’, political in nature, at stake in the Meroni case.XIII 
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The CJEU held that it is in the full power of the EU legislature -as composed of the EU 
Parliament and the Council through the ordinary legislative procedure ex art. 289 TFEU- to 
confer implementing powers on EU agencies. This demonstrates the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, as the EU legislature may confer powers of administrative nature not specifically 
allocated to EU institutions by the Treaties, on third bodies legally included in the Treaties. 
Even if the Council is composed of its Member States, nonetheless this is a different 
framework from the one of supranational delegation. Both the nature of the EU legislature 
and the nature of the powers in question are different. The EU legislature is a different 
institutional actor, whose acts are the result of a deliberative procedure of two EU 
institutions, the European Parliament and the Council. Moreover, the powers conferred on 
EU agencies express administrative competences that are directly exercised at the 
supranational level and aimed at the internal market integration. However, to keep the 
conferral of these powers in line with the principle of institutional balance, guarantees about 
their nature and their exercise shall apply. Only because of these guarantees could the Meroni 
case law be mellowed. 
Administrative discretion shall be subject to a series of criteria and conditions set in 
legislative acts which limit and guide the exercise of administrative powers. This is clear from 
the ESMA - short selling case: the powers conferred on ESMA are not autonomous, but should 
be exercised according to the relevant regulations conferring the direct supervision powers 
and more specifically 1) only if a concrete risk to the financial stability is at stake and no 
competent national authority has intervened; 2) by taking into account a number of factors 
delineated in the short-selling regulation so that ESMA’s intervention does not create further 
risks in the financial markets (e.g., the risk of regulatory arbitrage, or the risk of reduction of 
liquidity or the creation of further uncertainty on the market); 3) by limiting the power of 
intervention to temporary and precise measures as outlined in the founding regulation; and 
4) by notifying the competent national authorities. 
As long as the Court recognises that the TFEU ‘expressly permits Union bodies, offices 
and agencies to adopt acts of general application’, the generally valid Romano principle cannot 
apply anymore to the specific case of EU agencies.XIV When setting the guarantees of judicial 
review, the TFEU only indirectly recognises the capability of EU agencies to adopt acts of 
general application. Firstly, when addressing the plea of illegality by guaranteeing the 
inapplicability of acts of general application to specific proceedings, article 277 TFEU 
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implicitly recognises that agencies can issue acts of general applications. Article 267 b) TFEU 
on the preliminary ruling addresses the interpretation of the acts of agencies and bodies as 
well as those of the institutions; furthermore, according to article 265 TFEU, the failure to 
act can be contested to agencies as well, under the same conditions that apply to EU 
institutions. Nonetheless, these provisions admit that acts of general application are now in 
the domain of EU agencies. 
What the ESMA - short selling case did was to recognise the new constitutional status that 
EU agencies achieved in the Treaties: to the extent that they laid down guarantees about the 
exercise of their powers, the CJEU could mellow the former severity of the Meroni doctrine 
without dismissing its general structure. 
This judicial development shows that the evolution of the constitutional framework of 
the EU Treaties can give rise to administrative organisations of powers which are 
supranational in character and cannot be reconnected to the will of the Member States to 
delegate competences to the EU. It is the EU legislature in its functional autonomy which 
may create administrative competences at the EU level (within the scope of the Treaties). 
Such a judicial development of EU administrative law shows the autopoiesis of the EU legal 
order as an autonomous constitutional subject. However, the theory of the original 
delegation of powers from the Member States to the EU shall assist in structuring the 
accountability and strengthening the legitimacy of EU agencies’ powers. 
 
4. Reconnecting EU agencies to the democratic principle 
 
The judicial evolution of the Meroni doctrine shows that from a supranational 
perspective, the EU is a legal order autonomous from its constituent Member States. The 
tasks of EU agencies evolved because of legitimate delegation by the EU legislature on the 
grounds of political choices made at the EU level. 
Under the rule of law, the way the integration works is somehow different from pure 
delegation of administrative functions from the Member States. This is a means to 
integration, but the EU legal order has been constructed so that it can autonomously develop 
its own functions within the limits of the Treaties. The oversight of the Member States, 
therefore, is subject to the autonomous functioning of the EU.  
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When looking at the growing powers and legitimacy of EU agencies, such autonomous 
developments of EU administrative law may have great potential for supranational 
integration in the internal market as well as side effects on the democratic accountability of 
the EU. The EU administrative framework can have a strong impact on effective 
harmonisation in the internal market, but it is also clearly disconnected from the national 
democracies adhering to the EU. As political science scholarship has underlined, this 
mismatch may raise significant trade-off issues between efficiency and legitimacy in the 
implementation of EU agencies’ tasks (Egan 1998: 499-501). 
Administrative law can help to fill the accountability gap and put in place effective 
mechanisms of control over EU agencies’ powers. The implementation of administrative law 
guarantees beyond the state can help to circumscribe the growth of powers at the EU level 
and contain the distance of these bodies from national democracies. However, EU 
administrative law has not provided effective answers yet. It has not yet recognised the 
relevance and the role of administrative discretion and, consequently, has not developed a 
coherent accountability system that consistently frames supranational administrative action. 
As Chiti observed (2016: 587-591), when dealing with administrative power, EU 
administrative law has focused on how to functionalise it to the implementation of EU law, 
but it has not been concerned with the establishment of a conceptual framework aimed at 
understanding the exercise of administrative powers in conformity with the rule of law and 
democracy. The reason for this failure lies in the disconnection of the development of EU 
administrative law from its political roots and in its reduction to a functional means of 
integration. 
 
5. The commitment to accountability 
 
When looking at EU agencies’ powers from the EU level, the existence of legal remedies 
to their action and of a framework of political accountability to the EU legislature shall shape 
the exercise of their powers. When looking at the same issue from the perspective of the 
Member States, procedural rules can limit and guide the exercise of agencies’ powersXV as 
well as the existence of organisational arrangements which allow a representation of Member 
States’ interests in the agency’s boards. In the current framework of EU agencies, these 
variables are articulated in different ways and not all are fully developed and in place. I will 
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point out the criticalities of these legal arrangements with the aim of showing the difficulties 
when reconciling the political and legal dimensions. 
When discussing the political accountability framework, the delegation of regulatory 
tasks to EU agencies shall be supervised by the EU legislature through the enforcement of 
accountability mechanisms which allow the legislature to check that the exercise of the 
conferred administrative powers is in line with the mandate. Both ex ante and ex post 
mechanisms shall operate and ensure that EU agencies exercise only administrative powers 
within the scope of their remit. According to the (even revised) Meroni doctrine, any in blanc 
delegation of powers that implies a full shift of responsibilities cannot be legitimate, as far as 
delegation shall not involve a loss of responsibility for EU institutions, but only a further 
refinement of their tasks. Besides the definition of clear conditions for the exercise of 
powers, however, the ex ante control of the EU legislature is not remarkable in the current 
framework of EU agencies’ powers. On the contrary, agencies intervene autonomously and 
the counterparts of their action are directly the Member States’ agencies and private parties 
operating in the sector of reference. 
In this regard, the presence of representatives of the Member States on the management 
boards of EU agencies might help to find more sustainable regulatory solutions which take 
into account the diversification of national contexts. Empirical research has not provided 
conclusive findings on the effects of de jure or de facto vertical accountability mechanisms 
connecting members of the management boards and the correspondent national institutions. 
Findings express some variance; but today these mechanisms are not able to effectively 
reconnect EU agencies to the national political legitimacy (Buess 2015: 101-107).XVI 
The presence of national representatives on the management boards may also hamper 
EU agencies’ autonomy and delay the exercise of agencies’ powers in favour of more 
concerted measures which may not have the same effectiveness. In the case of the ESAs, for 
instance, adjudication powers aimed at requiring the competent national authorities to take 
the necessary action in accordance with EU law and if necessary, at substituting the 
competent national authorities’ decisions and making decisions directly applicable to 
financial institutions,XVII have never been exercised in the five years since their foundation. 
One reason for the failure to fully use supervisory powers shall be found in the structure of 
the governance of the ESAs. As their board of supervisors is composed of representatives 
of the national competent authorities, before the adoption of restrictive measures addressed 
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to the same national authorities, they preferred to pursue the supervisory convergence goal 
by using non-binding mediation, persuasion and reputational instruments which are less 
burdensome on the addressed national competent authorities.XVIII 
Ex post accountability mechanisms operate with the EU legislature and mainly consist 
in the submission of an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council which 
shall give account of the activities carried out.XIX If the annual report is the traditional method 
used to ensure the accountability of independent agencies in the Member States, the highly 
technical nature of reports does not allow a substantive control of the EU legislature on the 
performance. For instance, a concise version of the report in layman terms could be usefully 
submitted, so as to enhance the understanding of EU agencies’ activities and allow politicians 
to effectively know the methods and to see the results of EU agencies’ performances. 
This accountability framework shows that the EU legislature substantially confers 
powers on EU agencies, but it is not equipped with effective control powers. In this light, it 
is not by chance that the 2012 Common Approach has introduced an ‘alert/warning system’ 
to be activated by the Commission if it has ‘serious reasons for concern’ that an EU agency 
may act beyond its mandate, may violate EU law or may be ‘in manifest contradiction with 
EU policy objectives’.XX If the EU agency does not accommodate the Commission’s request, 
the latter informs the European Parliament and the Council with the aim of settling the 
institutional conflict. Vos (2014: 32-33) has suggested that this provision might be susceptible 
to introducing a form of ‘ministerial responsibility for agencies’ acts’ in relation to EU 
commissioners. The search for complementary accountability instruments that beyond their 
specific goals can set up a wider political accountability framework is key to reconnecting 
EU agencies to the composite nature of the EU and to consolidate their legitimacy. 
Alongside the political accountability framework, legal accountability can also play a 
significant role and limit possible illegitimate use of administrative powers. As seen, the 
existence of effective judicial protection is a necessary pre-condition for the allocation of 
powers to EU agencies. The nature of the judicial scrutiny on administrative acts is key (Türk 
2013). The question is what level of deference the judiciary takes towards EU agencies’ acts 
when complex technical assessments are submitted to the judicial review.XXI Clearly, the 
scrutiny on facts, the compliance with the criteria of delegation and the enforcement of 
procedural rights when taking administrative measures and acts are essential elements for 
making the judicial review effective. In the EU courts’ case law, when complex technical 
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assessments are at stake, courts cannot substitute their appraisal of the case with the one of 
the competent institution and judicial review shall focus on how the discretionary powers 
have been applied. 
Since the leading case Technische Universität München, the criteria for such a control have 
been consolidated and judicial review has consisted of how the competent authorities have 
performed ‘the duty (…) to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the 
individual case’.XXII Judicial review therefore consists of scrutiny of the law and the facts 
which grounded the decision in question, as well as of procedural review. When applying this 
standard to EU institutions, the EU courts applied the manifest error standard: as long as 
EU institutions have not exceeded the bounds of their discretion, only manifest distortions 
in the exercise of the conferred powers are illegitimate (Craig 2012:408-409 and 441-445; 
A.H. Türk 2013: 141).XXIII Even if EU agencies have different status from EU institutions, it 
is reasonable that EU courts apply the same standard of review, but within the different 
boundaries of (technical) discretion. This means also checking the delegation criteria. 
According to Technische Universität München, if the fundamental guarantees of fairness – 
particularly the careful and impartial examination which is closely linked to the right to be 
heard and the duty to give reasons –XXIV are not correctly enforced, the legitimacy of the 
administrative measures shall be successfully challenged. In this regard, if EU agencies were 
called to follow a common EU administrative procedure, judicial review could be favoured 
and the exercise of (technical) discretion could be more controlled. 
Even if EU agencies adopt their own rules of procedure based on the general principles 
set in the founding regulations and in the case law, this cannot have the same legal value of 
a general law about the EU administrative procedure in terms of protection of procedural 
rights and controls over the exercise of administrative powers. In fact, the choice of 
procedural rules is not neutral to the final decision. The way the procedure is articulated 
allows some interests rather than others to be taken into account and this affects both fact-
findings and decision-making (della Cananea 2004: 207). When leaving the definition of the 
procedure to EU agencies, the prioritisation of interests itself is left to agencies. 
The autonomy with which EU agencies can organise their own administrative procedure 
seems to be at odds with the allocation of administrative powers of supervision and 
regulation to actors who are not legitimated through the democratic circuit and are also far 
from the national demoi. The implementation of procedural guarantees through primary law 
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would positively affect the compliance with the constraints of the (even mellowed) Meroni 
doctrine. The democratic principles embedded in the Meroni doctrine would benefit from 
the existence of an administrative procedure law which ensures procedural legitimacy in the 
exercise of EU agencies’ powers. The introduction of an EU administrative procedure law 
would make the exercise of (regulatory) powers more visible to the Member States as well as 
to European citizens and sector-operators. 
 
6. Final remarks. In need for a public law paradigm for EU law 
 
By analysing the evolution of EU agencies’ powers, this article aimed to point out the 
complexity of the EU identity and the insufficiency of single paradigms to explain the hybrid 
nature of the EU legal order. The autonomy of the EU legal order and its derived legitimacy 
from the constituent Member States emerged as faces of the same legal reality. From a legal 
point of view, the powers and the limits of the EU legal order exceed the classification as an 
experiment of administrative governance, but at the same time the legal autonomy of the EU 
cannot disregard the national dimensions when developing its own dimension. 
The complex foundations of their powers rests upon the evolution of the Meroni 
doctrine in the EU case law. When setting the constitutional principle of the limits to 
delegation of EU institutions’ powers to other entities, the CJEU has demonstrated it is 
sensitive (only) to the mutation of the constitutional framework of the Treaties. Only when 
EU agencies acquired a constitutional status and their powers have been subject to defined 
conditions and explicitly recognised as amenable to judicial review, have they become 
legitimate actors able to exercise implementation powers with a regulatory impact. 
When considering the ‘mediated legitimacy’ of the EU as envisaged by the administrative 
paradigm of EU integration, EU agencies’ powers cannot be explained as a supranational 
delegation experience. They can be interpreted as further fragmentation of national 
normative powers which involves a relaxation of Member States’ oversight aimed at the 
development of the (supranational) internal market. However, this development is legally 
justified only according to the autonomous framework of EU law. The legal inconsistency 
of supranational delegation to explain such a specific development of EU law demonstrates 
that the administrative paradigm, based on supranational delegation from the Member States, 
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may not be sufficient to encompass this institutional aspect of EU law. A wider paradigm is 
therefore needed; a paradigm that can also cover the autonomous developments of EU law. 
The instruments of public law may provide the useful approach, giving a good measure 
of the different aspects of EU law. Under a public law paradigm, the compatibility of EU 
agencies’ powers may be assessed within the framework of EU law as an autonomous legal 
system composed of the Member States. The legitimate powers of EU agencies shall be 
compatible with the principle of conferral as set in the Treaties and thus with the balance of 
powers within the EU. Benchmarks of the compatibility of EU agencies’ powers can be 
identified through administrative law instruments which can re-connect the supranational 
administration to EU institutions, as well as to the Member States. 
The balance of EU powers can be implemented by strengthening the political 
accountability framework and by settling possible illegitimate alterations through judicial 
review. From the perspective of the Member States, organisational arrangements and 
procedural restrictions to the exercise of EU agencies’ powers can help to administratively 
protect against any unwanted extension of EU regulatory tasks. Procedural arrangements 
also protect individual citizens against arbitrary decisions of EU administrative bodies. 
Administrative law can thus provide the instruments for containing an unnecessary 
proliferation of administrative agencies. 
As seen, not all these arrangements are in place and their effectiveness may be 
strengthened, so as to implement new benchmarks for the Meroni doctrine. If more 
regulatory powers are conferred upon EU agencies, the implementation of these 
arrangements would become a preliminary condition that allows to maintain in equilibrium 
the different elements that compose the EU legal order. 
EU law as a specific experience of public law presents an original character where the 
administrative dimension is embedded in the constitutional structure of the Treaties and 
both these aspects contribute to explaining and nourishing the EU integration process. The 
constitutional status of the EU is not structured as in the Member States through the 
traditional state doctrine, but nonetheless it is legally enforceable and it also frames 
supranational administrative governance. 
The administrative approach to EU integration points out the gap between the legal 
dimension of the EU and its political nature and it recalls the need to safeguard democratic 
instance in the expansion of EU powers. For this reason, from a pure legal perspective, a 
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public law paradigm for EU integration would contain and respect these different 
components in a broader framework. A paradigm that is not open to unify these 
administrative and constitutional aspects is not able to explain the complexity of the EU legal 
order. As long as administrative law cannot explain the whole reality of the EU legal order, 
methodologically this means accepting that a single legal discipline cannot explain the EU 
legal order. Different legal disciplines shall engage in an interdisciplinary dialogue aimed at 
understanding the nature of the EU in the polymorphous domain of public law. This 
dialogue would help to approach the EU as a specific public law experience, which can be 
analysed but not captured through the categories of the single legal disciplines. 
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